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Objecting to Race
ANTHONY

V. ALFIERI*

"'You've got African-Americans, you've got Hispanics, you've got a bag full
of money. Does that tell you-a light bulb doesn't go off in your head and say,
'This is a drug deal?"
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INTRODUCTION

On America's inner-city streets and in its criminal courts, the new, long
awaited post-racial century of equal justice has yet to come. 2 For low-income
communities of color, and young Black 3 and Hispanic men in particular,
stigmatizing visions and narratives of racial identity pervade the criminal justice
system. At discrete moments and in distinct locales, prosecutors, criminal defense

lawyers, and judges all see, hear, or speak of the cultural and social stigma of race
in both run-of-the-mill and high profile cases. Their race talk constructs part of
the socio-legal discourse typical of contemporary federal and state criminal trials,
and oftentimes civil rights trials, across the nation.
Modern efforts by bar associations, courts, and legislatures to regulate the use
of race talk in civil rights and criminal cases have faltered4 not only in describing

its various race-neutral,5 race-coded,6 and race-conscious 7 forms, but also in
prescribing the scope of its permissible use under legal ethics codes8 and
standards, 9 judicial rules, and statutes. 0 The descriptive and prescriptive
difficulty of defining and regulating race talk in the courtroom and in advocacy
more generally raises fundamental normative and instrumental questions about
racial justice and professional ethics in the lawyering process, a process marked

by the daily exercise of mainly unseen and mostly unaccountable discretion.

2. See Mario L. Barnes, Reflection on a Dream World: Race, Post-Race and the Question ofMaking It Over,
11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & PoLCY 6, 12 (2009); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1595
(2009); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-RacialRacism: Racial Stratificationand Mass Incarcerationin the Age of
Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1024-25 (2010).
3. This Essay capitalizes the terms "Black" and "White" when used as nouns to describe a racialized group.
See Anthony V. Alfieri & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Next-Generation Civil Rights Lawyers: Race and
Representation in the Age of Identity Performance, 122 YALE L.J. 1484, 1488 n.5 (2013) (reviewing KENNETH
W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012) and DEVON W.
CARBADO & MITu GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2012)) (preferring use

of the term "Blacks" to the term "African Americans" because of its greater inclusivity); see also Kimberl6
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (explaining that "Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other
'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun").
4. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Ethics, Race, and Reform, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1403-04 (2002).
5. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Gideon in White/Gideon in Black: Race and Identity in Lawyering, 114 YALE L.J.
1459, 1464-68 (2005) [hereinafter Alfieri, Gideon in White].
6. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Jim Crow Ethics and the Defense of the Jena Six, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1651, 1654
(2009); Alfieri, Gideon in White, note 5, at 1467-74.
7. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in Community: Representing "Colored Town," 95 CAL. L. REV. 1829, 1834
(2007); Alfieri, Gideon in White, supra note 5, at 1474-75.
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2013) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (defining misconduct).

9. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function, Standard No. 4-7.1 (Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed.
1993) (governing the defense function and courtroom professionalism); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The
Prosecution Function, Standard No. 3-5.8(c) (Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed. 1993) (recommending that prosecutors
"should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury").
10. C.f., e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 47 (selecting jurors); 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2014) (peremptory challenges).
11. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (1988).
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Normative questions-whether lawyers should object to race-turnon intrinsic

personal and professional value commitments to race, dignity, identity, and role.
Instrumental questions-when and how lawyers should object to race-reston

tactical, outcome-oriented calculations about the best interests of clients, groups,
organizations, and sometimes whole communities.
For two decades I have explored both sets of questions through case studies of
the prosecution1 2 and defense1 3 of black and white offenders in the criminal
justice system and case studies of individuals and communities of color in civil
rights litigation. 14 The studies have analyzed the meaning of racial identity and
narrative, 15 the trial16 and retrial17 of race cases, the relationship between race
and ethics,1 8 the impact of racial and ethnic differences on civil rights and
criminal trials, 1 9 and the interconnections of race and community. 2 0 At bottom,
these studies share certain basic moral, socio-cultural, and political assumptions.
The first is that race talk implicates difference-based individual, group, and

12. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, ProsecutingRace, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999) (exploring race-conscious
models of prosecutorial discretion); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting the Jena Six, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1285
(2008) (explicating racialized norms of prosecution); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing
Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2000) (linking the prosecution of racial violence and the reconstruction of
interracial community); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. 2227 (2001)
(comparing the role and impact of race within both criminal prosecution and defense functions).
13. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1301 (1995) (parsing
the racial form and content of criminal defenses in cases of black-on-white racial violence); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory ofRacialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) (presenting a modern
taxonomy of racialized defenses).
14. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Education and Access to Justice in a Time of Scarcity:
Notes from the West Grove Trolley Garage Case, 2013 Wis. L. REv. 121 (mapping community education and
outreach partnerships with low-income communities of color); Anthony V. Alfieri, Integrating into a Burning
House: Race- and Identity-Conscious Visions in Brown's Inner City, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (2011) (locating
interconnections between civil rights advocacy and faith-based community organizing); Anthony V. Alfieri,
PaternalisticInterventions in Civil Rights and Poverty Law: A Case Study of EnvironmentalJustice, 112 MICH.
L. REV. 1157 (2014) (reviewing SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013))

(searching out paternalism rationales in legal-political campaigns for environmental justice).
15. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 805 (2008) [hereinafter Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity] (exploring the content of racial identity and
narrative in civil rights and poverty law advocacy).
16. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (1998) (sketching the advocacy
contours and ethical implications of race trials).
17. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1141 (2003) (considering the
normative and sociolegal meaning of the resurgent prosecution of long-dormant cases of white-on-black racial
violence).
18. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ingan Ethic ofJustice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999) (framing
race-conscious approaches to community representation and ethical regulation); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing
Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1996) (integrating racial norms and narratives into professional ethics
canons).
19. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Color/Identity/Justice: Chicano Trials, 53 DUKE L.J. 1569 (2004)
(reviewing IAN F. HANEY LOPEz, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003)) (extending racial

critique of American law to the study of ethnicity in Chicano communities of color).
20. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors,90 CAL. L. REV. 1465 (2002) (evaluating the
efficacy of community-based criminal prosecution initiatives).

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

1132

[Vol. 27:1129

community identities. The second is that race talk often, though perhaps not
always, inflicts cultural and social stigma that harms individual dignity, inhibits
individual self-elaboration as the public expression of personhood, and hinders
full participatory group integration into civic culture and society. The third is that
a strong individual and collective sense of dignity or personhood enables human
authenticity, moral agency, and rational volition. And the fourth is that
participatory group integration entails open engagement in the political process
and affords equal opportunity in the economic marketplace untainted by bias and
discrimination. 21 The upshot of these clustered assumptions is a still developing,
albeit inchoate, socio-legal account of race talk as inimical to human dignity,
authentic self-elaboration, equal treatment, and full political and economic

liberty. 2 2
To further advance that account, this Essay revisits ongoing questions of race
talk and racial representation in the context of current civil rights and criminal
justice practice through the prism of the recent United State Supreme Court
decision in Calhoun v. United States and its underlying federal trial and appellate
proceedings.2 3 Building on Calhoun's factual and legal foundation, the Essay
proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the definition of race talk garnered from

the text of Justice Sotomayor's statement in Calhoun. Part II examines the
prosecutorial exploitation of race talk gleaned from the briefs of the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Western District of Texas and the Solicitor General's
Office of the U.S. Department of Justice. Part III considers defense-driven
objections to race talk culled from the Calhoun defense team's federal appellate
brief and petition for writ of certiorari and from the opinions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the statement of Justice Sotomayor. Although
limited in scope, the Essay seeks in pursuing these inquiries to transform the
pedagogy and practice of civil rights and criminal law in American courtrooms as
well as in law school classrooms and community clinics.

I. DEFINING RACE TALK
"Ihope never to see a case like this again."

Race talk is contingent on law, culture, and society. Historically constructed, it
is shaped by, and gives shape to, legal doctrine and lawyering strategy, cultural
identity, and social caste in local, regional, national, and even international
contexts. 25 In lexical terms, race talk sounds in epithets,2 6 colloquial speech,2 7

21. For a fuller discussion of these assumptions, see Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity, supra note 15, at 806-09.
22. See Alfieri, (Un)CoveringIdentity, supra note 15, at 809.
23. Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136, 1136 (2013) (Statement of Sotomayor, J.).
24. Id. at 1138 (Statement of Sotomayor, J.).
25. In local contexts, for example, race and immigration narratives mix to give rise to "citizenship talk." See
generally Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and

2014]
and coded
engenders
Rooted in
with other

OBJECTING TO RACE

1133

idioms. 28 In performative and visual terms, it conjures up images 29 and
practices which influence behavior, cognition, and interpretation.3 0
conscious, unconscious, 3 1 or implicit 3 2 bias, race talk often intersects
categories of bias, including ethnicity 33 and gender. 3 4 The intersection

Race Perspectives,75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2493 (2007) (comparing notions of citizenship in race and immigration
scholarship); Kathryn Abrams, Performative Citizenship in the Civil Rights and Immigrant Rights Movement
(Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (tracing commonalities in civil rights and immigrant
rights movements). See also Leisy J. Abrego, Legal Consciousnessof UndocumentedLatinos: Fearand Stigma
as Barriers to Claims-Making for First-and 1.5-GenerationImmigrants, 45 LAw & Socy REv. 337 (2011)
(tracking elements of fear and stigma in the legal consciousness of multi-generational immigrants).
26. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H. Blume, & Patrick M. Wilson, Racial Epithets in the Criminal
Process, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 755 (reporting on use of racial epithets in criminal trials and misconduct-based
standards of assessment).
27. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, "He is the Darkey with the Glasses On": Race Trials Revisited, 91
N.C. L. REv. 1497 (2013) (outlining new research directions for the continued study of race trials).
28. See generally Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781 (1994) (evaluating race-based self-defense claims by criminal
defendants).
29. See N. Jeremi Duru, The CentralParkFive, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man,
25 CARDOzO L. REv. 1315, 1330-39 (2004); Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal
Law: The Relationship between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in Southern
Antebellum and Modern Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1165, 1184-05 (1995); Joan W. Howarth,
Representing Black Male Innocence, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 97, 120-38 (1997); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial
Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1739, 1743-66 (1993).
30. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,87 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 876, 877, 889-91 (2004); Christine Chambers Goodman, The Color Of Our Character
Confronting The Racial Characterof Rule 404(B) Evidence, 25 LAW & INEQ. 1, 11-24 (2007).
31. See generally Adjoa Artis Aiyetoro, Can We Talk? How Triggersfor Unconscious Racism Strengthen the
Importance of Dialogue, 22 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (2009) (recommending open dialogue on race and unconscious
racism); Ralph R. Banks & Richard T. Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter? Law, Politics,and Racial
Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009) (citing the role of unconscious bias in racial discrimination); Tanya
Kateri Hernandez, Bias Crimes: UnconsciousRacism in the Prosecutionof "RaciallyMotivated Violence," 99
YALE L.J. 845 (1990) (documenting race-tainted prosecution of bias-related violence); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
UnconsciousRacism and the CriminalLaw, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016 (1988) (surveying race-infected criminal
law doctrine and criminal court performance).
32. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REv. 1124, 1179 (2012); Cynthia Lee,
Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martinand Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-RacialSociety, 91 N.C. L. REv 1555,
1586-1608 (2013); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 347-50 (2007); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial
Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L. J. 2626. 2634-40 (2013); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson,
The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 795,
823 n.116 (2012).
33. See generally Andrew W. Bribriesco, Latino/a Plaintiffsand the Intersectionof Stereotypes, Unconscious
Bias, Race-Neutral Policies, and PersonalInjury, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373 (2010) (finding racially
disparate impact of jury bias in civil justice system); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience
ofRace to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1164-72, 1192-03 (1997).
34. See generally Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Lifting the Veil: The Intersectionalityof Ethics, Culture, and Gender
Bias in Domestic Violence Cases, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 31 (2008) (assessing impact of racial, cultural, and gender
stereotypes in domestic violence cases); Jyoti Nanda, Blind Discretion: Girls of Color & Delinquency in the
Juvenile Justice System, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1502 (2012) (considering the relationship between the juvenile
justice system and girls of color).
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of multiple kinds of bias in civil rights and criminal cases 35 exacerbates common
stereotypes and reinforces long-held prejudices. 3 6 The stereotypes evoke antebellum visions of black immorality and inferiority and rekindle postbellum class and
caste prejudices.

The criminal justice system offers substantial evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct 37 predicated on racial bias and often rooted in stereotypes. 3 8 In
current federal and state courts, 39 prosecutors still speak of "black folk"44 0 and

35. See Leslie Espinoza Garvey, The Race Card: Dealing With Domestic Violence in the Courts, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 287, 295-307 (2003); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment
Discriminationand the "Diversity" Defense, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 259, 316 (2007).
36. See Jody Armour, Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break The PrejudiceHabit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 738
(1995); Steven D. DeBrota, Arguments Appealing to Racial Prejudice: Uncertainty, Impartiality, and the
Harmless ErrorDoctrine, 64 IND. L.J. 375, 384 (1989).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 735-37 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (improper manipulation of
racial stereotypes); Smith v. Farley, 59 E3d 659, (7th Cir. 1995) (conflating race and witness credibility); United
States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, (2d Cir. 1973) (adverting to characteristics of black
defendants); Reynolds v. State, 580 So. 2d 254, 255-57 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (repeatedly citing race of
the accused); People v. Walker, 411 N.YS.2d 377, (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (describing the defendant through
racial epithets); see also Ryan Patrick Alford, Appellate Review ofRacist Summations: Redeeming the Promise
ofSearching Analysis, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325 (2006) (addressing indirectprosecutorial deployment of racial
stereotypes); Michael Callahan, "If Justice Is Not Equal ForAll, It is Not Justice": Racial Bias, Prosecutorial
Misconduct, and the Right to a Fair Trial in State v. Monday, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 827, 833-847 (2012)
(assessing prosecutorial misconduct and appeals to racial bias in trials); Elizabeth L. Earle, Banishing the
Thirteenth Juror: An Approach to the Identification ofProsecutorialRacism, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1222-23
& nn.67, 71 (1992) (identifying violations of the rule proscribing prosecutorial racism); Andrea D. Lyon, Setting
the Record Straight: A Proposalfor Handling ProsecutorialAppeals to Racial, Ethnic or Gender Prejudice
During Trial, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 319, 336 (2001) (revising standards and remedies for prosecutorial
misconduct); V.A. Richelle, Racism as a Strategic Tool at Trial: Appealing Race-Based Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2357 (1993) (outlining appellate challenges to prejudicial and inflammatory trial
statements by prosecutors); see also Note, Racial Bias and Prosecutorial Conduct at Trial, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1588 (1988) (discussing judicial standards and remedies for prosecutorial bias). See generally BENNETT L.
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 11:6 (2d ed. 2013) (cataloguing prosecutorial inflammatory remarks
and appeals to racial prejudice).
38. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESs 4

(2010); Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the DisappointingRight to Counsel, 122 YALE L. J. 2236, 2241-46 (2013);
William Quigley, Racism: The Crime in Criminal Justice, 13 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 417, 417 (2012); Bryan A.
Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, DeliberateIndifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice,
51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 509, 525 (1994).
39. For discussion of judicial bias in federal and state courts, see generally Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley,
Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An EmpiricalAnalysis of RacialHarassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117
(2009) (suggesting that African American judges as a group and White judges as a group perceive racial
harassment differently); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225 (2009) (observing that "judges might be overconfident about their abilities to
control their own [racial] biases"); see also Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy:
Discrimination,Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 338-39 (2012) (reporting
statistically significant discrepancy between rulings of majority and minority judges on employer-specific
summary judgment motions in federal district court civil rights employment discrimination cases).
40. See State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556 (Wash. 2011); see also State v. Montano, 813 N.W.2d 612, 616
(N.D. 2012) ("The defense wants you to believe that there's something wrong with the system, that they use

people like that. What's that mean? Black people?"); United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(referring to "the Jamaicans"). Cf United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502-03 (8th Cir. 1996); Tannehill v.
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"niggeritous,"4 1 distinguishing "white" men as witnesses,42 "white" women,4 3
and "white" neighborhoodst from their black cohorts, and invoking "nature"
and "innate" instinct to rationalize key prosecutorial decisions in pretrial, trial,
and appellate proceedings.45
Similarly, jurors hear and speak in racial tones.46 Their speech sometimes
articulates crude modes of racial reasoning exemplified by this juror statement in
the 1983 trial of a Wisconsin prostitution case: "Let's be logical. He's black and
he sees a seventeen year old white girl-I know the type."4 7 Like other types of
reasoning, racial reasoning involves inferences of causation suggested by this
juror statement in the 2007 trial of a New Hampshire bank robbery case: "I guess
we're profiling but they cause all the trouble."4 " Racial reasoning also frames
perception, indicated in this juror statement in the 1975 trial of a New York
burglary case: "You can't tell one black from another. They all look alike." 4 9
Like prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers employ race talk. To win acquittal,
urge nullification, 0 or mitigate punishment, defenders talk of race, 1 culture,52
State, 48 So. 662, 662 (Ala. 1909); Moseley v. State, 73 So. 791, 791 (Miss. 1916) ("She is a negro; look at her
skin. If she is not a negro, I don't want you to convict her.").
41. Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495, 505 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) ("And scripture tells us there is a time to rend
or reap what one has sown and he needs to know that, quote, this is not another case ofniggeritous.") (emphasis
in original).
42. See Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[N]ot one white witness has been
produced in this case that contradicts the victim's account."); Allison v. State, 248 S.W.2d 147, 147 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1952) (commenting on "same race" witnesses); James v. State, 92 So. 909 (Ala. Ct. App. 1922) ("'Are you
gentlemen going to believe that nigger sitting over there (pointing at the defendant), with a face on him like that,
in preference to the testimony of [the local] deputies?'); Moseley, 73 So. at 791 ("'It is just a question of
whether or not you believe this negro or [a white man]."'); Simmons v. State, 71 So. 979, 979 (Ala. Ct. App.
1916) ("You must deal with a negro in the light of the fact that he is a negro, and applying your experience and
common sense[.]").
43. See Wallace v. State, 768 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) see also Allen v. State, 112 So.
177 (Ala. 1927) ("[The defendant's lawyers] ask you to believe a couple of Negroes instead of the white girls.").
On class, gender, and race in the South during the early twentieth century, see JAMES R. ACKER, SCOTTSBORO AND
ITS LEGACY: THE CASES THAT CHALLENGED AMERICAN LEGALAND SOCIAL JUSTICE 21-23 (2008); DAN T. CARTER,
SCOTTSBORO:

A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 25-28 (Rev. ed. 2007); JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF

SCOTTSBORO 19-23, 163-72 (1994).
44. See Bates v. United States, 766 A.2d 500, 507 (D.C. 2000) (discussing prosecutor's rebuttal to defense
counsel's statement that the police stopped the accused because he was in a "bad neighborhood"); People v.
Armstrong, 298 N.YS.2d 630, 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) ("'It was brought out that he was in a white
neighborhood and he was Negro."').
45. See Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 1978) ("I argue to you that the average white
woman abhors anything of this type in nature that had to do with a black man. It is innate with us.").
46. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and
Juries?A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 997, 1000 (2003); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is RaceA Factorin Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 126 (2006).
47. See Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1156 (8th Cir. 1987).
48. See United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 86 (1st Cir. 2009).
49. See Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
50. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105
YALE L.J. 677, 679-80 (1995); Tania Tetlow, DiscriminatoryAcquittal,18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 112-16
(2009).
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group status,5 3 and systemic bias.54 And like prosecutors, their talk pervades both
routine public defender cases and prominent death penalty cases. 5 Also like
prosecutors, their race talk mixes colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious
narratives.

A. COLORBLIND, COLOR-CODED, AND COLOR-CONSCIOUS RACE TALK
Colorblind, race-neutral talk 6 recognizes the presence of race, for example
in the area of search and seizure,5 yet posits claims of neutrality. 59 Bound to
anti-classification commitments6 0 and apprehensive about race-based segregation ' and separatism,62 race-neutral talk offers analytic silence and remedial

51. See Christopher Slobogin, Race-Based Defenses-The Insights of TraditionalAnalysis, 54 ARK. L. REV.
739, 739-41 (2002).
52. See generally Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural
Defense, 49 ARIz. L. REV. 911 (2007) (arguing that minority and immigrant cultural defense claims are more
likely to receive accommodation when there is convergence between their cultural norms and American cultural
norms); Cynthia Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness,81 MINN. L.
REV. 367, 490-91 (1996).
53. See generally Richard Delgado, Making Pets: Social Workers, "Problem Groups," and the Role of the
SPCA-Getting a Little More Precise About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1571 (1999) (broadening
inquiry of racial narrative to address civil as well as criminal trials and nonwhite groups other than African
Americans); Eugene R. Milhizer, Group Status and Criminal Defenses: Logical Relationship or Marriage of
Convenience?,71 Mo. L. REV. 547, 577-78 (2006).
54. See Jonathan A. Rapping, Implicitly Unjust: How Defenders CanAffect Systemic RacistAssumptions, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB. POL'Y 999, 1009-15 (2013).
55. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit RacialAttitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1540-42 (2004); Andrea D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousnessfor
CriminalDefense Attorneys, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 755, 756-767 (2012).
56. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, "A Nation ofMinorities": Race, Ethnicity,and Reactionary Colorblindness,59
STAN. L. REV. 985, 994-95 (2007); Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 203, 206 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color
Blindness" DiscourseDisrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification,88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 88-94 (2000); Reva
B. Siegel, From Colorblindness toAntibalkanization:An Emerging Ground ofDecision in Race Equality Cases,
120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1288 (2011); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal
Justice, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7 (2007).
57. See Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 404, 450-56 (2012).
58. For race-conscious accounts of search and seizure doctrine, see Paul Butler, The White Fourth
Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 247-52 (2010); Frank Rudy Cooper, Post-Racialism and Searches
Incident to Arrest, 44 ARIz. ST. L.J. 113, 120-22 (2012).
59. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 837, 847-56. See
generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race- Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991) (arguing
that race has a deep social significance that continues to disadvantage blacks and other people of color); David
A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99 (arguing that the prohibition against racial
discrimination bars the use of accurate racial generalizations that disadvantage blacks).
60. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggle Over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1470, 1471-72 (2004).
61. See Sarah Spiegel, Prison "Race Riots": An Easy Case for Segregation?,95 CAL. L. REV. 2261 (2007)
(maintaining that prison segregation entails racial classification and carries a racist social meaning).
62. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural
America, 47 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1004-08 (1995).
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inaction when confronted with racialized conduct in law and society. 63 Color- or
race-coded talk,64 by comparison, deals with race through veiled stereotypes6 5
illustrated in drug prosecutions, 6 party identification and profiling disputes,
religious affiliation, 6 9 and even geographical associations.70 Race-conscious talk,
in contrast, discerns extant racial consciousness in law71 and in the social and
political construction of color among individuals, groups, and communities.7 2 To
exploit, and at times to thwart, bias in criminal trials, prosecutors,73 defenders,7 4
and judges75 repeatedly embrace in whole or in part a color-conscious ethic of
advocacy and adjudication. However partial, their embrace signals the possible
63. Cf. Margalynne J. Armstrong and Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness:
Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 635, 651-663 (2008) (illustrating the silence and
inaction that race neutrality creates in the classroom).
64. See, e.g., State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2005) ("You heard nothing about gangs other
than what came from the State's witnesses telling about their past association and some wild and, I submit, racist
speculation on the part of counsel here, that because these men who happen to be black are in-have been in
gangs in the past, despite their testimony about trying to get on with their lives, that they are people to be feared,
they're rough characters. Well, we know what that's a code word for He's a big, strong black man, but he's a
rough character.") (emphasis added).
65. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessonsfrom Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 1241, 1273-75 (2002); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes
about Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 489-90 (2004).
66. See Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POLY REV.
257, 261-65 (2009); Editorial Board, How Race Skews Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/opinion/how-race-skews-prosecutions.html.
67. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934,
935-338 (1984).
68. See Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 60-81 (2001);
Brooks Holland, Racial Profiling and a Punitive Exclusionary Rule, 20 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 29,40-42
(2010).
69. See Christie Stancil Matthews, Missing Faith in Batson: Continued Discrimination Against African
Americans Through Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges, 23 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs L. REV. 45, 46 (2013).
70. See State v. Franklin, 526 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (discussing crime victims and racial
geography).
71. See Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a Color-Conscious Professional Ethic
for Prosecutors, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1542-1553 (2012). Cf Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On
Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CiN. L. REV. 269,
280-93 (1994) (examining ways that raced coding and embedded narratives of racial domination maintain and
recreate white racism in law); Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization,
Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DuKE L.J. 781, 787 (2006) (surveying U.S. Supreme Court
doctrine on affirmative action in higher education and government contracting as well as race-conscious
redistricting to identify the principal concern to which different requirements of individualized consideration
respond).
72. See George A. Martinez, African-Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of Race: Toward an
Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 213, 219-21 (1998); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural
Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958-60 (1995).
73. See Murray, supra note 71, at 1568-89; see also Aya Gruber, Murder Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85
U. COLO. L. REV. 129, 164-70 (2014).
74. See Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race- Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1585, 1600-01 (1999).
75. See Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 CONN. L. REV. 243, 244-245
(2000); Abbe Smith, Defense- Oriented Judges, 32 HOFSTRAL. REV. 1483, 1487-1488 (2004).
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emergence of an alternative color-conscious canon76 or a modified vision of
racialism. 77 Of necessity, this alternative canon or vision of the prosecution and
defense function in the advocacy and adjudication of race cases within the
criminal justice system must address questions of both normative prescriptionwhether lawyers should object to race-andinstrumental calculation-when and
how lawyers should object to race.
B. CALHOUN V UNITED STATES

Recently, in Calhoun v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
prosecutorial use of, and the appropriate objection to, race talk.7 " In Calhoun, the
Supreme Court denied the petition of Bongani Charles Calhoun, a black
convicted felon, for a writ of certiorari. 7 9 In a statement addressing the denial of
the writ petition, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, opined: "I write to
dispel any doubt whether the Court's denial of certiorari should be understood to
signal our tolerance of a federal prosecutor's racially charged remark."o
Unequivocally, she announced: "It should not."8 1
Sotomayor's uncommon certiorari statement opened with a brief recitation of
the procedural and factual underpinnings of the Calhoun case. Calhoun,
Sotomayor began, "stood trial in a federal court in Texas for participating in a
drug conspiracy."8 2 The primary issue at trial, she explained: "was whether

76. See Shani King, The Family Law Canon in a (Post?)Racial Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 633-39 (2011).
77. See Ralph Richard Banks, Beyond Color Blindness: Neo-Racialism and the Future of Race and Law
Scholarship, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 41, 41-42 (2009).

78. Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136, 1136 (2013) (Statement of Sotomayor, J.). On August 4, 2010,
a federal grand jury in San Antonio, Texas returned a three-count superseding indictment charging Calhoun for
conspiracy and the unlawful, knowing, and intentional attempt to possess with intent to distribute five or more
kilograms of cocaine, and for possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime. Brief
for Appellee at *2, United States v. Calhoun, 478 Fed. App'x 193 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing R. 112-15). On March
7, 2011, Calhoun proceeded to a jury trial before U.S. District Court Judge Harry Lee Hudspeth. Id. (citing R.
161-64). On March 8, 2011, the jury convicted Calhoun on all three counts of the superseding indictment. Id.
(citing R. 163-64). On June 21, 2011, Judge Hudspeth sentenced Calhoun to a 180-month term of imprisonment
along with five years supervised release. Id. at *2-*3 (citing. 206-07). On July 1, 2011, Calhoun filed a timely
Notice of Appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Id. On June 7, 2012, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed Calhoun's conviction. United States v. Calhoun, 478 Fed. App'x 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
79. Calhoun, 133 S. Ct. at 1136; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136
(2012) (No. 12-6142).
80. Calhoun, 133 S. Ct. at 1136.
81. Id.
82. Id. At trial, Judge Hudspeth granted Calhoun's voir dire request to question the venire in order to learn
whether "anyone has any problems or feelings or emotions against African-Americans." Brief for Appellee at
*13 n.4, United States v. Calhoun, 478 Fed. App'x 193 (5th Cir.) (No. 11-50605) (citing R. 291). Judge
Hudspeth stated: "Ladies and gentlemen, the record of course wouldn't show this until somebody brought it up,
but all of you who are in the courtroom, all of us, know with regard to the subject of race or ethnicity that Mr.
Calhoun, the defendant in this case, is an African-American." Id. He added: "And my question of course would
be: Is there anyone who feels from [sic] any reason that he or she would be influenced by that and it would make
it more difficult for you to serve as a fair and impartial juror in this case?" Id. (citing R. 291-92). Judge Hudspeth
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Calhoun knew that the friend he had accompanied on a road trip, along with the
friend's associates, were about to engage in a drug transaction, or whether instead
Calhoun was merely present during the group's drive home, when the others
attempted to purchase cocaine from undercover Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) agents." 8 3 Law enforcement officers, she pointed out, "testified that they
discussed the drugs with Calhoun immediately before they broke cover to arrest
the group, and that Calhoun had a gun when he was arrested." 8 4 Alluding to
post-arrest trial proceedings, Sotomayor referred to Calhoun's own testimony
that "he was not part of and had no knowledge of his friend's plan to purchase
drugs, that he did not understand the DEA agents when they spoke to him in
Spanish only, and that he always carried a concealed firearm, as he was licensed
to do."8 5 Rather than assess or reweigh conflicting witness testimony, Sotomayor
opted to defer to the Calhoun jury, remarking: "It was up to the jurors to decide
whom they believed." 6
Having crystalized the issue of Calhoun's intent, Sotomayor inspected the
central elements of the trial itself, especially Calhoun's cross-examination and
testimony. The issue of intent, she commented, "came to a head" when the federal
prosecutor cross-examined Calhoun at trial.8 7 On cross-examination, she noted,
"Calhoun related that the night before the arrest, he had detached himself from
the group when his friend arrived at their hotel room with a bag of money."88
Sotomayor recapitulated Calhoun's testimony "that he 'didn't know' what was
happening, and that it 'made [him] think ... [t]hat [he] didn't want to be
there."' 8 9 She observed that the prosecutor at hand "pressed Calhoun repeatedly
to explain why he did not want to be in the hotel room[,]" adding that presiding
U.S. District Court Judge Hudspeth "[e]ventually ... told the prosecutor to move
on. "90 At that point, Sotomayor emphasized, the prosecutor brazenly "asked,
'You've got African-Americans, you've got Hispanics, you've got a bag full of
money. Does that tell you-a light bulb doesn't go off in your head and say, This
is a drug deal?" 91

Without hesitation, Sotomayor defined the prosecutor's question as "racially

also invited members of the venire to discuss their reservations privately at the bench; reportedly "[n]o one
came forward." Id. (citing R. 292). The Government's Brief asserted that "eleven of the twelve jurors selected
from the venir [sic] had easily-recognizable Spanish names." Id. (citing R. 293-94).
83. Calhoun, 133 S. Ct. at 1136. Sotomayor added: "Two alleged co-conspirators who had pleaded guilty
testified to Calhoun's knowledge." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Trans. 125-126 (Mar. 8, 2011)).
90. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
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charged" in content. 92 She also pointedly identified Calhoun as AfricanAmerican, parsing his claim that "the prosecutor's racially charged question
violated his constitutional rights."93 At the same time, she highlighted the fact
that Calhoun's counsel "[i]nexplicably ... did not object to the question at
trial." 94 As a result, she explained, Calhoun's petition for writ of certiorari came
to the Supreme Court 95 on plain-error review, a standard of review under which
he would ordinarily have to "demonstrate that [the error] 'affected the outcome of
the district court proceedings.' 96 Sotomayor made clear, however, that Calhoun's petition declined even to "attempt" that showing. 97 Instead, she cited
Calhoun's contention that the prosecutor's "comment should lead to automatic
reversal because it constitutes either structural error or plain error regardless of
whether it prejudiced the outcome."98 Sotomayor discounted those contentions

on the ground that they "were forfeited when Calhoun failed to press them on
appeal to the [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Fifth Circuit." 99 Referencing that
procedural posture as well as the "unusual way" Calhoun's defense counsel
litigated the case, she endorsed the Supreme Court's decision to deny the

petition. 00
Despite this conclusion, Sotomayor closely scrutinized the conduct of the
federal prosecutor at Calhoun's trial. Roundly condemning that conduct, she
stated: "There is no doubt ... that the prosecutor's question never should have
been posed."o0 Sotomayor marshaled three grounds in support of her prosecutorial criticism: equal protection, jury impartiality, and professional ethics. First,
she asserted that the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection "prohibits
racially biased prosecutorial arguments." 10 2 Second, she maintained that "by
threatening to cultivate bias in the jury" such prosecutorial conduct "equally
offends the defendant's right to an impartial jury." 10 3 Third, she adverted to the
"settled professional standard that a 'prosecutor should not make arguments

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1136-37.
96. Id. (citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

734 (1993))).
97. Id. at 1137.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30 (1987)).
103. Id. Sotomayor commented: "Judge Frank put the point well: 'If government counsel in a criminal suit is
allowed to inflame the jurors by irrelevantly arousing their deepest prejudices, the jury may become in his hands
a lethal weapon directed against defendants who may be innocent."' Id. (quoting United States v. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 659 (2d. Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).
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10 4
calculated to appeal to the prejudices of the jury."'
Enlarging upon these constitutional and professional prohibitions, Sotomayor
rebuked the federal prosecutor not only for "suggesting that race should play a
role in establishing a defendant's criminal intent," but also for "tapp[ing] a deep
and sorry vein of racial prejudice that has run through the history of criminal
justice in our Nation." 105 She recollected a criminal justice system at "a time
when appeals to race were not uncommon," recalling cases when prosecutors
exploited racial and gender stereotypes to sway jury deliberationsio0 or invoked
racial epithets to inflame jury passions.10 7 Although Sotomayor acknowledged
that the prosecutor's comment in Calhoun "was surely less extreme[,]" 0 she
underscored that "it too was pernicious in its attempt to substitute racial
stereotype for evidence, and racial prejudice for reason."1 09
Turning more broadly to the criminal justice system, the rule of law, and the
duties of federal prosecutors, Sotomayor confessed to her own profound
disappointment "to see a representative of the United States resort to this base
tactic more than a decade into the 21st century." 1 0 That trial tactic, she insisted,
"diminishes the dignity of our criminal justice system and undermines respect for
the rule of law.""' Contrary to long-standing expectations of the U.S. Government to seek justice in its criminal justice prosecutions,1 12 she added, such
strategic calculations worked "to fan the flames of fear and prejudice." 1 3 Instead
of properly "discharging the duties of his office in this case," she lamented, "the
Assistant United States Attorney for the Western District of Texas missed the
mark."' 14
For Sotomayor, federal prosecutors in Calhoun missed the mark both at trial
and on appeal. Amplifying her criticism, she mentioned two notable incidents of
"troubling" conduct by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of
Texas and by the Solicitor General's Office of the U.S. Department of Justice.115

104. Id. (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Prosecution Function and Defense Function, Std.
3-5.8(c), p. 106 (3d ed. 1993)).
105. Id. (citing Holland v. State, 22 So. 2d 519, 520 (Ala. 1945)).
106. Id. ("[A] prosecutor might direct a jury to 'consider the fact that Mary Sue Rowe is a young white
woman and that this defendant is a black man for the purpose of determining his intent at the time he entered
Mrs. Rowe's home[.]') (citing Holland v. State, 22 So. 2d 519, 520 (Ala. 1945)).
107. Id. ("'I am well enough acquainted with this class of niggers to know that they have got it in for the
[white] race in their heart."') (quoting Taylor v. State, 100 S.W. 393, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1138.
111. Id.
112. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors"Seek Justice"?,26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 618 (1998);
K. Babe Howell, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice
System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 305-21 (2014).
113. Calhoun, 133 S. Ct. at 1138.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, she complained, "the
Government failed to recognize the wrongfulness of the prosecutor's question,"
diminishing its import by "calling it only 'impolitic"' and averring that "it did not
prejudice the outcome." 16 Upon its review of the petition for writ of certiorari,
she added, the Office of the Solicitor General only belatedly conceded that the
Government "prosecutor's racial remark was unquestionably improper[,]'17 and
then "only after the Solicitor General waived the Government's response to the
petition at first, leaving the Court to direct a response." 18
Sotomayor offered equally robust criticism of Calhoun's defense counsel,
assailing his performance on the grounds of ineffective representation and ethical
irresponsibility.11 9 She commented, for example, that Calhoun's defense attorney
failed to challenge or attack the prosecutor's comment until closing argument. 12 0
This oversight, she remarked, allowed the prosecutor to reprise his earlier
cross-examination question on rebuttal at closing. 12 1 Indeed, at closing argument,
the prosecutor stated: "I got accused by [defense counsel] of, I guess, racially,
ethnically profiling people when I asked the question of Mr. Calhoun, Okay, you
got African-American[s] and Hispanics, do you think it's a drug deal? But there's
one element that's missing. The money. So what are they doing in this room with
a bag full of money? What does your common sense tell you that these people are
doing in a hotel room with a bag full of money, cash?" 1 2 2
Sotomayor's account of the trial and appellate performance of the Government
prosecutors and defense lawyers in Calhoun helps elucidate the form and
substance of race talk in contemporary advocacy and adjudication. To Sotomayor, race talk takes the form of "racially charged" remarks and questions.
Unsurprisingly, the precise form of a racially charged comment varies by
individual case and by local context, fluctuating from extreme remarks (e.g., "'I
am well enough acquainted with this class of niggers to know that they have got it
in for the [white] race in their heart.') 12 3 to less extreme questions, as here. 124
For Sotomayor, race talk of both kinds cultivates bias, fans fear, and appeals to
prejudice inside federal and state courtrooms. Equally harmful, race talk in

116. Id. Sotomayor noted: "This prompted Judge Haynes to 'clear up any confusion-the question crossed
the line."' Id. (citing United States v. Calhoun, 478 Fed. App'x 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2012) (Haynes, J.,
concurring)).
117. Id. (citing Brief for the United States in Opposition at *7-*8, Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136
(2013) (No. 12-6142)).
118. Id.
119. Sotomayor's criticism carried short of invoking Calhoun's Sixth Amendment right to counsel or finding
that his defense counsel fell below the standard of effective assistance. For further discussion on the standard of
effective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
120. Calhoun, 133 S. Ct. at 1137 n.* (quoting Tr. 167-168 (Mar. 8, 2011)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 100 S.W. 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907)).
124. Id.
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Calhoun and elsewhere unfairly establishes the criminal intent of the accused,
harmfully conveys class or group stigma specific to the accused, and baselessly
treats stereotypical construction as an innate or natural character trait of the
accused.
And yet, however sensitive to the individual and institutional harm of race talk
and insistent of lawyers' moral or ethical imperative to object to "racially
charged" remarks, Sotomayor's account of the prosecutorial and defense conduct
in Calhoun offers only vague guidance as to the categorical form and substance
of such remarks and as to the exact timing and the precise method of objecting to
such remarks. The definitional, temporal, and methodological vagueness of
Sotomayor's admittedly limited account reflects the historically contested
construction, and the long standing regulatory tolerance, of race talk in the
criminal justice system. The end result of that disputed construction and
institutionalized tolerance is illustrated by the exploitation of and quarrel over
race talk in Calhoun and in criminal law cases throughout American federal and
state courts.

II. EXPLOITING RACE TALK
"[S]ummon that thirteenth juror, prejudice."'

1 25

This Part considers the prosecutorial exploitation of race talk in Calhoun and
in criminal law cases more broadly. Both prosecutors and defenders exploit race
talk. Defenders, for example, employ race-based defenses, relying on bias and
prejudice, 12 6 diminished capacity, 1 2 7 culture, 12 8 identity, 12 9 and even "rotten
social background" 30 for exculpatory, mitigation, or nullification purposes.

125. Id. ("'He should not be permitted to summon that thirteenth juror, prejudice."') (quoting United States
v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 659 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).
126. See Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 1-12 (1994).
127. See Olympia Duhart, A Native Son's Defense: Bigger Thomas and Diminished Capacity, 49 How. L.J.
61, 77-79 (2005).
128. See CYTHNIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM
96-124 (2003); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN,

THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 23-182 (2004); Victoria Ajayi, Note,

Violence Against Women: The Ethics of Incorporating the Cultural Defense in Legal Narrative, 25 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 401, 401-02 (2012); James J. Sing, Note, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of
Provocation and Culture in Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845, 1849-52 (1999).
129. See Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense,
51 RUTGERS L. REv. 45, 46-52, 60-62 (1998).
130. Cf Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of
Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 12-23 (1985) (arguing that criminal law should recognize
a defense of "rotten social background"); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and
Legislatures Ignore Richard Delgado's Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REv. 79, 83-86 (2011)
(discussing the sole case to address the "rotten social background" defense).
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Although vulnerable to censure and disapproval on ethical, 1 3 1 communitarian,132
and narrative1 3 3 grounds, race-based defenses find wide justification in the
aggressive advocacy norms of the criminal defense function. 13 4
In prior work, I have argued that prosecutors, defenders, and civil rights
lawyers alike should avoid strategic narratives and arguments that exploit and
publicly disseminate harmful, stereotypical constructions of racial identity. The
disparaging portrayal of black or other minority civil rights plaintiffs, criminal
defendants, and crime victims to gain an adversarial advantage or to lessen
punishment not only demonstrates the paternalism, class bias, and elitism of

prosecutors, civil rights advocates, and criminal defense lawyers, but also
reinforces the historical markers of racial caste and class. 13 5 Widespread in trial
testimony and appellate briefs, and embedded in well-worn tropes and images,
these identity and narrative markers portray racial inferiority, deviance, and
functional disability as natural or normal features of clients and communities of
color. Inured to their own biases and assumptions, the same lawyer-crafted
identity and narrative constructions frequently omit reference to the daily
displayed racial dignity of minority clients and the frequently exhibited racial
solidarity of minority communities. 13 6 The Calhoun prosecutors, both in the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Western District of Texas and in the Solicitor General's
Office, committed this same omission.
A. THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Taken up on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the U.S.
Attorney's Office defended its conduct with respect to both Calhoun's trial and
his sentence. On the issue of Calhoun's trial, the Government addressed the
question whether Calhoun's conviction should be affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
"because the prosecutor's question and rebuttal comment, though impolitic, did
not prejudice the jury but ... instead helped reveal [Calhoun]'s knowing
participation in the May 19th drug deal?" 1 37 On the issue of Calhoun's sentence,
the Government dissected the question whether Calhoun's sentence was presump-

131. See John William Clark IV, Comment, Batson v. Kentucky and the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: Is a Violation of Batson Also an Ethical Violation?, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 205, 207-09 (2004).
132. See Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the
Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 922-933 (1995).
133. See Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 117, 122-23
(2002); Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 18-19 (2000).
134. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1730-31 (1993); Abbe
Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for UnmitigatedZeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28
HOFSTRA L. REv. 925, 948-61 (2000).
135. See Alfieri & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1550.
136. See id. at 1551-53.
137. Brief for Appellee, United States v. Calhoun, No. 11-50605 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2012), 2012 WL 475910 at
*2.
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tively reasonable and, thus, should be affirmed. 13 8
In its brief, the Government tied its prosecutorial trial conduct to Calhoun's
decision to take the stand in his own defense and, more closely, to his testimony
on cross-examination.139 Upon cross-examination, the Government explained,
the prosecutor sought to test Calhoun's credibility by questioning "his reaction to
seeing the large stash of cash that was unpacked in the hotel room[]" and by
challenging his "apparent defense that he was an innocent bystander to the drug
deal." 1 4 0 To that end, the Government maintained, the prosecutor asked Calhoun
"what he thought the 'this bag full of money was for."' 1 4 1 Calhoun briefly
replied: "It made me think I didn't want to be [in that room]."1 42 Next the
prosecutor asked: "Did you think they were going to do something illegal?"1 4 3
Calhoun responded: "I did not know."1 4 4 At this point, the Government
continued, when the prosecutor reiterated his line of questioning about the
"scene" in the hotel room, Calhoun's defense counsel objected and the following

colloquy ensued. 14 5
THE COURT: "Well you're starting to argue with the witness. But all he's
trying to find out is what was it about the situation that smelled bad to you?"
DEFENDANT CALHOUN: "The money."
THE COURT: "I understand but what-what-why would the sight of money
shock you so much?"
DEFENDANT CALHOUN: "The amount of it."
THE COURT: "All right. And why would that scare you?"
DEFENDANT CALHOUN: "Because that's not-why we came down here
was to have fun and party, not to bring bags of money to a room-a bag of
money to a room."
THE COURT: "Why would somebody bring a bag of money into a room?"
DEFENDANT CALHOUN: "I don't know."
THE COURT: "All right next question."
AUSA PONDER: "I didn't-you're telling this to this jury."
DEFENDANT CALHOUN: "Iunderstand."
Q (By AUSA PONDER): "You've got African-Americans, you've got Hispanics, you've got a full bag of money. Does that tell you-a light bulb doesn't go
off in your head and say, This is a drug deal?"

138. Id.
139. See id. at *9-10.
140. Id. at *10-11 (citing R. 615-618).
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at *11 (citing R. 615).
Id. (citing R. 616).
Id. (citing R. 616).
Id. (citing R. 616).
Id. (citing R. 616).
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A [DEFENDANT CALHOUN]: "No, sir."
Q (by AUSA PONDER): "Okay. But it did made [sic] you nervous enough that
you went and got a room?"
A [DEFENDANT CALHOUN]: "Yes, sir."1 4 6
At closing argument Calhoun's counsel revisited this colloquy, stating:
"Government thinks that just because your [sic] African-Americans and Hispanics in a room that you have a drug deal. And I hope that we open our minds a little
more than that and don't consider that."1 4 7 That statement, the Government
asserted, prompted the prosecutor immediately to rebut what he perceived to be
unwarranted, race-motivated criticism directed toward the U.S. Attorney's
Office. For purposes of rebuttal, the prosecutor responded:
All right, I got accused by Mr. Moritz of, I guess, racially, ethnically profiling
people when I asked the question of Mr. Calhoun, Okay you got AfricanAmericans and Hispanics, do you think it's a drug deal? But there's one
element that's missing. The money. So what are they doing in this room with a
bag full of money? What does your common sense tell you that these people are
doing in a hotel room with a bag full of money, cash? None of these people are
Bill Gates or computer [sic] maggots-maggots-magnets-maggots? None of
them are real estate investors. You know, in these days of credit lines and credit
cards, very few transactions, legitimate business deals, are done in a hotel room
with cash. $400,000 in cash. The only one that I can think of is a drug deal. And
Mr. Calhoun says, Oh, I saw that money. I was thinking bad things. Sure he
was, if that's true. You would be too if you suddenly walked in and you saw a
bag full of money and these guys hanging around. You'd say, Uh-oh what have
I walked into? Assuming you were ignorant of all of this going on in the first
place. 148
Soon after, the Government noted, Judge Hudspeth in charging the jury issued
"several limiting instructions including admonitions that statements and argument by counsel were not evidence, that the jury was the sole judge of the
credibility of the witnesses." 1 4 9 The instructions, the Government mentioned,
included a "mere presence" instruction to the jury150 and occurred without the

146. Id. at *11-12.
147. Id. at *12 (citing R. 650).
148. Id. at *12-13 (citing R. 657-58).
149. Id. (citing R. 660-63).
150. Id. (citing R. 668). On "mere presence" jury instructions, see 16 KEviN F O'MALLEY ET AL., 1A FED.
JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 16:09 (6th ed. 2014) ("Merely being present at the scene of a crime or merely knowing
that a crime is being committed or is about to be committed is not sufficient conduct to find that Defendant
committed that crime. In order to find the defendant guilty, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that in addition to being present or knowing about the crime, charged in [Count of] the indictment
Defendant knowingly [and deliberately]associated [himself] [herself]with the crime charged in some way as a
participant-someone who wanted the crime to be committed-not as a mere spectator."). See also, e.g., United
States v. Allred, 867 F.2d 856, 859, 869 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he trial court specifically instructed the jury on the
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objection of defense counsel. 151 Within three hours of deliberation, the Government pointed out, "an unbiased, apparently predominantly Hispanic jury found
Calhoun guilty as charged." 1 5 2
Given the facts and circumstances of the Calhoun trial, the Government
argued, the Fifth Circuit should reject the claim that "the prosecutor's crossexamination question and remark on rebuttal closing fatally prejudiced [Calhoun's] right to a fair trial."1 5 3 Both the prosecutor's question and remark, the
Government insisted, "were intended to reveal that Calhoun had knowledge of,
and participated in, the drug deal that was to take place the next day when he
witnessed his co-defendants unload 400,000 odd dollars in a San Antonio hotel
room."1 5 4 Intent, knowledge, and participation, the Government observed,
comprised "essential elements of the government's case against Calhoun."15 5
More specifically, the Government reasoned, the prosecutor's question standing alone "was not so pronounced and persistent that it permeated the entire
atmosphere of the trial."15 6 The Government described the question as a "single"
and "completely isolated" inquiry pursued "toward the end of an extended period
of cross-examination of what Calhoun knew, or did not know, about the
impending drug deal."15 7 However "impolitic" that inquiry, the Government
conceded, its "intended effect" aimed "to undercut Calhoun's claim that he found
himself in that hotel room merely as part of a weekend of partying in San
Antonio"15" and to bolster "the knowledge element of the Government's case
against Calhoun, and its theory that he was willing and knowledgeable
participant in the drug trafficking conspiracy."l5 9 In fact, the Government
asserted, "by the time the question was asked, the jury had already heard
extensive testimony during the government's case-in-chief that Calhoun had

essential elements of the crime of conspiracy, that mere presence or similarity of conduct does not establish
membership, that the indictment charged a conspiracy to defraud the Government, that each appellant could be
convicted only if he 'knew that some co-conspirators sought to defraud the Government and that with
knowledge of this unlawful purpose the Defendant willfully agreed to join a co-conspirator's scheme to defraud
the Government."'); United States v. Natel, 812 F.2d 937, 940-941 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding the evidence that
defendant was present at the scene insufficient to prove defendant's guilt for the crime); United States v.
Vergara, 687 F.2d 57, 60-61 (5th Cir. 1982) ("No showing of an overt act is necessary in a drug conspiracy
prosecution, but knowledge, intent and participation, the essential elements of the crime, must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.").
151. Brief for Appellee, United States v. Calhoun, No. 11-50605 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2012), 2012 WL 475910 at
*13.
152. Id. (citing R. 673, 682).
153. Id. at *15.
154. Id. at *16.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *19 (citing R. 617).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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actual knowledge his reason for being in San Antonio was the drug deal."16 0 The
Government also noted that, "the prosecutor quickly moved to another line of
questioning, and Calhoun's negative response itself helped to dispel any
theoreticallyprejudicialeffect." 16 1

Likewise, the Government claimed, the prosecutor "properly framed" his
rebuttal remark "to defuse the defense's inflammatory closing argument," and in
doing so, "refocused the jury's attention on the credibility of Calhoun's testimony
and the substantial evidence of his guilty knowledge which included testimony
from his co-conspirators and government agents that Calhoun knew he was going
to San Antonio to complete a drug deal." 1 6 2 In this way, the Government
maintained, the prosecutor's remark was part of a calibrated "effort to urge the
jury to conclude that Calhoun knew criminal activity was afoot because the
presence of $400,000, not the ethnic or racial characteristics of his coconspirators, in the room was beyond the pale of normal legal activity."1 6 3 That
effort, the Government contended, "le[]d the jury to conclude that Calhoun's
testimony was not credible and that he was a knowing participant in the drug

conspiracy."l64
In sum, from the Government's standpoint, the rebuttal remark offered by the
federal prosecutor at trial was actually "prompted" by Calhoun's attorney's own
cunning "attempt on closing to cloak the prosecutor with a mantle of racial
prejudice"16 5 and, accordingly, did not exceed the range of response necessary to
"'right the scale' and "counteract the defense's closing argument."166 Perversely, this argument permitted the federal prosecutor at issue to protest the
defense team's weak interposition of race talk at closing argument and, at the
same time, to exploit the Government's stereotypical vision of Calhoun's racial
identity. On its face, the defense team's oblique, passing reference to race talk at
closing appears to have been intended to negate the prosecutor's earlier
racially-charged question on cross-examination, and thus, ensure a fair and
impartial process of jury deliberation. In this respect, the defense team's conduct
comported with its obligation to furnish Calhoun effective assistance of counsel.
Taken separately or together, the Government declared, the federal prosecutor's cross-examination question and rebuttal remark could not be characterized
as improper or prejudicial, especially given the "wide latitude" traditionally
granted counsel in closing argument, the absence of timely defense objections,

the strong corroborating evidence of Calhoun's guilt, and the district court's

160. Id. at *19-20.
161. Id. at *20 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 358 (5th Cir. 2007)).

162. Id. at *16.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at *21 (citing R. 657-58).
Id.
Id. at *20 (citing R. 657-58).
Id. at *21 (citing United States v. Ramirez-Velasquez, 322 F.3d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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"accurate and thoroughgoing limiting instructions with regard to the evidence
and the jury's role as the sole judge of the facts and credibility of the
witnesses." 16 7 The Government added that the district court's cautionary,
"detailed instructions to the jury that they were to decide the case based on the
evidence rather than the statements of the lawyers, also followed quickly after the
prosecutor's rebuttal."16" For these reasons, in its appellate brief the Government
concluded that the prosecutor's cross-examination question and remark on
rebuttal closing neither violated Calhoun's right to a fair trial1 6 9 nor seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial,170 and therefore
did not constitute reversible plain error.17 1
B. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
Subsequently, in the Supreme Court, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted a brief for the Government in opposition to Calhoun's petition for a
writ of certiorari. The brief cast the question presented to the Court narrowly,
conceding the Government's racially improper question at Calhoun's jury trial in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. 17 2 The question (i.e.,
"Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the prosecutor's racially
improper question did not warrant reversal of petitioner's conviction under the
third prong of plain-error review.") construed the Court's inquiry chiefly in terms
of appellate court application of the plain-error standard of review.173
To establish the backdrop for the Court's analysis, the Solicitor General's brief
once again recounted the circumstances of the federal prosecutor's racially
improper question during the examination of Calhoun at trial. In rebuttal to the
closing argument of Calhoun's defense counsel, 17 4 the Solicitor General's brief
pointed out, the prosecutor addressed opposing counsel's suggestion that the
Government had "racially, ethnically profil[ed] people" in questioning Cal-

167. Id. at* 16.
168. Id. at *21. The Government speculated that "there is every indication that the instant jury did properly
follow the district court's instructions." Id.
169. Id. at *20 (citing United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 360 (5th Cir. 2007)).
170. Id. at *22 (quoting United States v. Gracia, 522 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 2008)).
171. Id. at *22 (citing United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 356 (5th Cir. 2005)).
172. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 117.
173. Id. at *1. On the plain-error standard of review, see Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But NotAlways
Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1173-85 (1995); Thomas M.
Hoskinson, Note, CriminalProcedure: Trial Integrity and the Defendant's Rights Under the Plain ErrorRule
52(b), 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1129, 1131-38 (2004); Norman L. Reimer, Lawyers Are Not Unicorns, But a
Race-BaitingProsecutorProves that a Failureto Object Can Be Fatal, 37 THE CHAMPION 7, 7-8 (2013).
174. At closing argument, Calhoun's defense counsel stated: "Government thinks that just because [there
are] African-Americans and Hispanics in a room that you have a drug deal. And I hope that we open our minds a
little more than that and don't consider that." Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 117, at *4.
Defense counsel raised no objection to the Government's questions either during Calhoun's examination at trial
or at closing argument. Id.
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houn. 75 Here again, according to the brief, the prosecutor stated: "But there's
one element that's missing. The money. So what are they doing in this room with
a bag full of money? What does your common sense tell you that these people are
doing in a hotel room with a bag full of money, cash? None of these people are
Bill Gates or computer [magnates]. None of them are real estate investors." 176
Against this background, the Solicitor General, though acknowledging that the
federal "prosecutor's racial remark was unquestionably improper," nevertheless
argued that the Fifth Circuit "correctly held that the error did not require reversal
because it did not affect petitioner's substantial rights, i.e., it did not cast doubt on
the outcome of the trial."177 Moreover, the Solicitor General contended that
Supreme Court review was unwarranted because the Fifth Circuit's decision was
correct and because it did not squarely conflict with any Supreme Court
precedent or any other court of appeals' decision.17 Further, the Solicitor
General claimed that Calhoun blundered in asserting that the "prosecutor's
improper racially tinged remarks constituted structural error requiring automatic

reversal."1 7 9

In its analysis of structural error,18 o the Solicitor General's Office conceded
that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52(b)" 1 "never conclusively resolved how structural errors would be
analyzed under the 'substantial rights' prong of plain-error review," and thus
never eliminated the possibility that "certain errors, termed 'structural errors,'
might 'affect substantial rights' regardless of their actual impact on an appellant's

trial."' 8 2 Nonetheless, the Solicitor General denied that the federal prosecutor
committed structural error in Calhoun, insisting that a structural error related to
"a 'defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than
simply an error in the trial process itself[,]' for example, in the presentation of
evidence to the jury. 18 3 By confining structural errors to "'a very limited class of
cases' and "a handful of defects," 18 4 and by erecting a strong evidentiary

175. Id. at 4-5.
176. Id. at 5.
177. Id. at 7-8.
178. Id. at 8.
179. Id.
180. For debate over structural error and reversal, see Amy Knight Burns, Note, Insurmountable Obstacles:
Structural Errors, Procedural Default, and Ineffective Assistance, 64 STAN. L. REv. 727 (2012) (arguing that
structural errors merit reversal even without proof of actual prejudice); Steven M. Shepard, Note, The Case
Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L.J. 1180 (2008) (contending that an error should
only be labeled structural and reversed automatically if it never contributes to a verdict).
181. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it
was not brought to the [district] court's attention.").
182. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 173, at * 9 (quoting United States v. Marcus, 560
U.S. 258, 258-59 (2010)).
183. Id. (citations omitted).
184. The Solicitor General acknowledged evidence of structural errors in the following circumstances: (1) a
total deprivation of counsel; (2) a biased trial judge; (3) the denial of a defendant's right to represent himself at
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presumption against finding "structural errors" where "'the defendant had
counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator,"'"1 5 the Solicitor General
effectively ruled out ascertaining structural errors even when "very serious
constitutional errors in the presentation of the case to the jury" occurred at trial,
provided at least that the errors stood "amenable to case-specific analysis for
prejudice." 8 6
In Calhoun, the Solicitor General treated the prosecutor's admittedly "improper suggestion that African-American and Hispanic persons gathered together
in a room with a large amount of cash would likely be engaged in a drug deal" as
a case-specific error related to the "presentation of the case to the jury," but
unrelated to the "overall framework" of the trial.18 7 This overarching framework,
the Solicitor General stressed, situated the prosecutor's "plain" error in the
context of the trial as a whole in order to determine whether it had a "sufficiently
adverse effect" on Calhoun's substantial rights actually to "cast serious doubt on
the correctness of the jury's verdict" and, hence, warrant reversal."" Notwithstanding the prosecutor's admittedly "egregious" misjudgment, the Solicitor General
concluded that the error proved "amenable to analysis in light of the nature and
effect of the improper comment in the context of the entire evidentiary
presentation." 189 To conclude otherwise, according to the Solicitor General,
would create "a broad new category of structural-error cases that would require
automatic reversal when a prosecutor makes improper racial remarks without a
showing that such remarks affected a defendant's substantial rights." 90

III. OBJECTIONS TO RACE TALK
"This Court should send a message to all prosecutors in the United States that
such foul, racial stereotypes have absolutely no place in American courtrooms." 1 9 1
Previously, in studying the contemporary use and misuse of race talk in

trial; (4) a violation of a defendant's right to a public trial; (5) racial discrimination in the selection of the grand
jury; (6) an erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt that affected all of a jury's findings; and (7) the denial of
the right to be represented by retained counsel of choice. Id.; see, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
23-24, n.8 (1967); Wash. v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 219 (2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999);
Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011); Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir.
2009).
185. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 173, at * 9 (quoting United States v. Marcus, 560
U.S. 258, 258-59 (2010)).
186. Id. at *10 (citation omitted).
187. Id.
188. Id. at *15-16. The Solicitor General reasoned that "the prosecutor's statements were 'isolated,' the
effect of the statements was 'mitigated' by the court's instructions to the jury, and the totality of the evidence
against petitioner was 'strong."' Id. at *15-17.
189. Id. at *11.
190. Id. at *13.
191. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136 (2013) (No. 12-6142).
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advocacy, I have argued that both prosecutors and defenders should work to
develop a primer or toolkit to challenge explicit and implicit courtroom
expressions of racism without impairing or risking the best interests of their
individual and organizational clients. 192 A useful starting point for the development of a toolkit of color- and race-conscious courtroom objections, coupled with
an alternative law school classroom and clinical pedagogy, is to investigate the
culture, language, social setting, and spatial geography of the courtroom itself. 193
A fair investigation raises numerous questions. For example, does the courtroom
or courthouse mark people of color as inferior? Are explicit or oblique forms of
race talk voiced in court by lawyers, judges, litigants, or courtroom personnel?
Do lawyers or judges object to race talk in confronting arrests, searches and
seizures, 1 94 and prosecutorial charging decisions, in conducting jury selection
and witness examination, or in making statements at trial and arguments on
appeal? Paradoxically, race-conscious questions of this sort entangle lawyers in
doctrinal, procedural, and evidentiary rules as well as in strategic and ethical
considerations fashioned initially to channel criminal justice advocacy towards
colorblind or race-neutral forms of representation and adjudication. 1 95 Those
guiding rules and considerations function to identify incidents, and to frame
claims, of discrimination. Well-illustrated by the frequently stymied regulation of
peremptory challenges during civil and criminal jury selection,196 at best the

guidelines operate inconsistently and govern unreliably, affecting only a limited
portion of the trial process. 1 97 Blinkered by race-neutral conventions, trial-based
incidents of bias and discrimination consequently tend to be treated as isolated
occurrences (i.e., stray remarks) and resulting race-based claims tend to be
framed narrowly (i.e., case rather than class specific). The literature of criminal

justice defense, civil rights litigation, clinical education, trial advocacy, and
Critical Race Theory has been slow to develop methods of aggregating and
generalizing incidents of discrimination not only in bounded arenas like the

192. Alfieri & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1544.
193. See id. at 1544-45. See generally JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS E.

CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE:

INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMs 25, 91-105,

134-92

(2011).
194. Alfieri & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1545-46.
195. Id.
196. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1986) (criminal trials); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1991) (civil trials); see also Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based
Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson
Challenge Procedure, 31 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 263 (2007).
197. See Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge
of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 501, 504-05 (1999); Susan N. Herman, Why the Court
Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1830
(1993); Sheri L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 21, 59 (1993).
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school-to-prison pipeline,1 98 but also in expansive fields like environmental
justice.199 The same literature has been halting in its attempts to widen the scope
of bias and discrimination claims to include fuller accounts of client and
community identity encompassing race, gender, class, and sexuality, for example,
in the field of marriage equality.2 0 0
Forging innovative methods of identifying and framing discrimination claims
requires a collaborative or integrative client- and community-based practice of
lodging objections that differentiates affirmative, race-conscious objections from
both colorblind, race-neutral objections and veiled, race-coded objections.
Differentiation hinges on recognizing the tendency of race-neutral objections to
deny the legitimacy and utility of racial analysis and the tendency of race-coded
objections 2 01 to rely covertly on, and even to reproduce, racial stereotypes. The
overt denial of the socio-legal relevance of race and the covert reliance on the
socio-legal stigma of racial stereotype in opposing civil rights claims and in
making criminal guilt/innocence determinations contrast sharply with the open
embrace of changing racial conceptions revealed in law, culture, and society
under an alternative professional regime of race-conscious objections. Predicated
on the cognitive and interpretive relevance of race to the advocacy process and to
the culture and sociology of law, that shifting embrace affects majority and
minority lawyers in different and unpredictable ways.2 02
A. THE CALHOUN DEFENSE TEAM
For the Calhoun legal defense team on appeal, race-conscious categories
framed each of the two questions presented to the Supreme Court. First,
"[w]hether it is fundamental or structural error not amenable to meaningful
review for the Government to resort to racial prejudice or stereotypes as an
indicia of guilt[.]" And second, "[i]f it is not structural error, is it always plain
error for the Government to interject racial stereotypes into a trial in order to
show the defendant's guilt?" 2 0 3 Both questions arise out of the prosecutor's

198. Progress in combating the school-to-prison pipeline in public education comes out of traditional social
reform movements. See, e.g., CATHERINE Y KIm, DANIEL J. LOSEN, & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON

PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 34-50 (2010) (laying groundwork for asserting school-to-prison pipeline
discrimination claims).
199. In the field of environmental justice, important work is emerging across disciplines. See, e.g., ROB
NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR 233-62 (2011) (linking environmentalism to

postcolonialism); Sarah Lashley & Dorceta E. Taylor, Why Can't They Work Together? A Framework for
Understanding Conflict and Collaboration in Two Environmental Disputes in Southeast Michigan, in
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 409-49 (Dorceta E. Taylor ed., 2010)

(studying racially and geographically discrete communities).
200. For a fuller account of client and community identity in the field of marriage equality, see Russell K.
Robinson, MarriageEquality and Postracialism,61 UCLA L. REV. 1010, 1035-67 (2014).
201. Alfieri & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1547-48.
202. See id. at 1548-50.
203. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 191, at *7.
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remarks on cross-examination and in closing argument.204 Together the remarks
provided a springboard for Calhoun's defense team to argue that racial and ethnic
stereotypes, and race and ethnicity more generally, "have no place in criminal
trials" except in "limited" cases. 205 For the Calhoun defense lawyers, the
prosecutorial use of such racial stereotypes in judicial forums, here embodied in
the Government's assertion "that when you have African-Americans around
Hispanics in the presence of large sums of money, it must be a drug deal[,]" in
fact "always violates the defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Component of the Fifth Amendment[.]" 2 0 6
The Calhoun defense team's race-conscious reasoning shaped its factual claim
that federal prosecutors acted deliberately to inject racial prejudice and stereotype as indicia of Bongani Calhoun's guilt at trial. That claim, in turn, informed
its legal contention that the trial prosecutor's racialized injection constituted
structural error not amenable to meaningful review, warranting automatic

reversal and prosecutorial misconduct review for the use of unconstitutional
racial tactics.2 07 The same reasoning animated the defense team's contention that
it is always plain error for prosecutors to interject racial stereotypes into a

criminal trial in order to show the defendant's guilt 20 8 not merely because the
error affects the substantial right of the accused to be tried fairly on the merits of

adduced evidence, but further because the "injection of racial stereotypes into
criminal trials affects the integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."2 09
Although Justice Sotomayor and Fifth Circuit Judge Catharina Haynes
diverged from the defense team's explicit racial reading of the record in Calhoun
and reached similar results in voting to uphold Judge Hudspeth's district court
decision, their reasoning converged in significant part with the defense team's
race-conscious explication of Calhoun's experience of discrimination at trial,
particularly what others have described as the "isolation and humiliation" and
"feeling of hopelessness incited by [the trial prosecutor's] racially prejudiced

comment." 2 10

204. Id. at *3.
205. Id. at *4 ("For example, it goes without saying that a description of a perpetrator or victim would
include race. Race would be relevant for an African-American to rebut allegations he was a member of the
Aryan Brotherhood.").
206. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
207. See id. at *4-5 (citations omitted).
208. Id. at 7-8.
209. Id. ("Petitioner asserts that racial or ethnic stereotypes have no place in the American criminal justice
system. He further asserts that this Court should take this opportunity to make that perfectly clear to everyone in
the Department of Justice.").
210. Veronica Couzo, Sotomayor's Empathy Moves the Court a Step Closer to Equitable Adjudication, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 420 (2013) ("The influence of her experience living as a minority allowed her to
easily assume the viewpoint of those in Calhoun's situation."). On empathy and emotion in judging, see Kathryn
Abrams & Hila Keren, Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MIN. L. REv. 1997 (2010); Susan A.
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B. THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Judge Haynes joined the panel's majority per
curiam opinion affirming the trial court judgment of Calhoun's conviction and
sentence, yet added her own concurring opinion "to express deep concern about
[the prosecutor's] conduct." 2 11 The Fifth Circuit's per curiam opinion held that
Calhoun failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor's remarks "cast serious doubt
on the correctness of the jury's verdict[J" and, therefore, failed to satisfy his
burden under the plain error standard of review.2 12 The Fifth Circuit opinion
enumerated three ostensibly race-neutral reasons for its assessment of Calhoun's
failure to discharge his plain error burden: the form and content of the
prosecutor's remarks, their prejudicial effect, and the presence of strong,
countervailing evidence of guilt.
First, as to form, the Fifth Circuit opinion noted that the "improper racial
overtone" of the prosecutor's question stood "isolated" from the bulk of the
cross-examination and, furthermore, pointed out that "the prosecutor moved on
to another line of questioning after Calhoun responded negatively to the
question."2 13 As to content, the opinion observed that the prosecutor's rebuttal
remarks at closing argument "were made in response to defense counsel's
reference of the question and focused on the presence of the large sum of money
rather than the race of the participants."2 14
Second, as to the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks, the Fifth
Circuit opinion found that any adverse or harmful impact "was mitigated by the
district court's instruction to the jury that the statements and arguments of the
attorneys were not evidence and that the verdict must be based only on the
evidence." 2 15 The opinion added that, "the district court had also ensured during
jury selection that no juror felt that he or she would be influenced by the fact that
Calhoun was African-American." 2 16
Third, as to evidence of guilt, the Fifth Circuit opinion commented that "the
evidence against Calhoun was strong," citing the testimony of several witnesses
that "indicated" Calhoun "was a knowing participant in the drug transaction."2 17
Moreover, the opinion cited Calhoun's own testimony "that the other participants
knowingly displayed over $400,000 in cash in front of him and brought him to

Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 24 (2011); Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of
Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1944 (2012); Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, in PASSIONS AND
EMOTIONs 243, 244, 246 (James E. Fleming ed., 2012).
211. Calhoun, 478 Fed. App'x at 194, 196.
212. Id. at 194-95.
213. Id. at 195.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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the scene of their planned drug purchase."2 1 8
Despite her endorsement of the Fifth Circuit's three-tiered reasoning in
Calhoun, Judge Haynes' concurring opinion advanced a discernibly raceconscious analysis of the prosecutor's trial conduct and its prejudicial impact.
Predictably, as a starting point, she reiterated a traditional tenet of race-neutrality,
stating: "it should be very clear (certainly to a lawyer licensed thirty-seven years
in Texas) that such racially-charged comments are completely inappropriate for
any lawyer." 2 1 9 However, she quickly departed from a strictly race-neutral
critique to establish that race and the injury of racial stigma were relevant
categories of legal analysis in criminal cases, as here. She observed: "It is hard to
think of a more foul blow than implying that the race or national origin of a group

of people has anything to do with whether Calhoun should have known they were
involved in dealing drugs." 2 2 0 Next, Haynes reverted back to a traditional
race-neutral stance, asserting that, "it is particularly inappropriate for an Assistant
United States Attorney-a prosecutor-to behave this way." 2 2 1 Widening her
criticism, she complained that "it should trouble the Assistant United States
Attorney in question and all those in his office not just that he said such a thing,
but that he thought it." 2 2 2 The higher obligation and title of "'prosecutor,"' she
exclaimed, "demands better." 2 2 3 Last, extending her critique to the organizational
setting of the federal prosecution function, Haynes returned to a forceful,
race-conscious articulation of the injury of racial stigma in criminal cases,
decrying "how the United States Attorney's Office has handled this matter,"
denouncing its "cavalier approach to this situation," its lack of "[a]n apology ...
in the briefing," and its expressed "doubt" that the question at stake "crossed the
line." 2 24 Deliberately mixing race-neutral and race-conscious norms, Haynes

declared: "Let me clear up any confusion-the question crossed the line. I hope I
will not have to say this again." 2 2 5 Notwithstanding the sharp reproof dispensed
by Justice Sotomayor and Judge Haynes, their concordant reasoning imposes a
heavy burden on race-conscious advocates and defenders seeking to demonstrate

218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 196 (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.08).
Id.
Id. (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the

representative . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,

but that justice shall be done .... He may prosecute with earnestness ... [b]ut, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strikefoul ones.") (emphasis in original); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.09, cmt. 1 ("A prosecutor has the responsibility to see that justice is done, and not simply to be an advocate.").
Judge Haynes added: "Prosecutors are held to a higher standard than even the high professional standards
applicable to all attorneys." Calhoun, 478 Fed. App'x at 196.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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plain or structural error.22 6 Discharging that burden requires a commitment to
race-conscious norms and an integration of race-conscious advocacy strategies at
trial and on appeal.
C. INTEGRATING RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS
Drawing on both race-neutral and race-conscious lines of inquiry and
categories of description, Haynes' shifting legal and ethical analysis demon-

strates the pervasive hold of race-neutrality on the judicial imagination 2 2 7 and the
difficulty of integrating openly race-conscious reasoning into the traditional
discourse of civil rights and criminal law advocacy and adjudication. The
integration of race-conscious reasoning into civil rights and criminal law
advocacy entails "the recognition of difference in the racial content, performance, and presentation of cases, clients, and communities of color." 2 2 8 Such
recognition requires confronting and naming race in the lawyering and criminal
justice process, and recasting racial identity and narrative in the defense of clients
and communities of color. 2 2 9 The purpose of naming and renaming race is not

only to negate damaging stereotypes, but also to intervene in order to safeguard
equal justice through unambiguously race-conscious legal-political practices.2 30
To a limited extent, Haynes' concurring opinion coupled with Sotomayor's
statement respecting the denial of the instant petition for writ of certiorari and the

Calhoun defense team's trial arguments and appellate briefs afford the opportunity to sketch the outline of a race-conscious primer or toolkit for civil rights
advocates and criminal defense lawyers, and equally so, for civil rights and
criminal law faculty in law school classrooms and community clinics. The toolkit
enables advocates and defenders seeking to challenge harmful adversarial race
talk, without compromising the best interests of their clients, to pursue

226. On the evidentiary burdens and doctrinal frameworks of harmless and structural error analysis, see
ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 37-51 (1970); David McCord, The "Trial"/"Structural"

Error Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1403-16 (1997); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm ofApplying Harmless Errorto Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 152, 157-58 (1991); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless ConstitutionalError, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 79, 82-83 (1988).
227. Cf Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-88 (2007) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate
interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race. The plurality's
postulate that '[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race'
is not sufficient to decide these cases." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
228. Alfieri & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1553.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 1554-56; cf Ariela J. Gross, From the Streets to the Courts:Doing GrassrootsLegal History
of the Civil Rights Era, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1233, 1239-49 (2012) (reviewing TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO
DISSENT:

ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2010) (commenting on the

relationship among law, politics, and social change from the 1940s through the 1970s, and the complex
negotiations and confrontations among different segments of the black community and the white community).
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race-conscious strategies of advocacy and ethics. Unconstrained by the raceneutral and race-coded conventions of traditional trial and appellate practice, the
strategies view racial bias and discrimination as deep-seated, structural conditions entrenched in law, culture, and society rather than as isolated, haphazard
occurrences linked to unintentional stray remarks or misdirected organizational
behavior. On this view, the trial or appellate interjection of racial stereotypes
disparaging of parties, witnesses, and victims for the purpose of swaying
determinations of credibility or guilt always violates the due process guarantees
and the equal protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution,231 and moreover, always taints the integrity and public
reputation of judicial proceedings.
Struggling to fashion vehicles for remedying and deterring the use of racial
epithets (i.e., "slurs") in the adjacent criminal context of capital punishment,

Sheri Lynn Johnson, John Blume, and Patrick Wilson, urge the wholesale
eradication of such epithets from the criminal process through the adoption of a
per se approach to trial and appellate court regulation.2 32 According to their
multi-step approach, "[w]hen a (1) decisionmaker in a (2) criminal case uses a (3)
racial epithet to address, describe, or refer to (4) the defendant, or in the case of a
lawyer, other defendants he or she contemporaneously represented or prosecuted,
and the defendant raises the resulting claim at (5) the first opportunity after he
discovers the use of the epithet, the defendant's (6) conviction should be
reversed." 2 3 3 Under this clear-cut, reflexive approach, a "decisionmaker" includes prosecutors, defense lawyers, jurors, and judges, though not witnesses. 234
Like Johnson, Blume, and Wilson, race-conscious advocates and defenders
seeking to cast serious doubt on the correctness of jury verdicts contaminated by
racial stereotypes and to meet the Calhoun burden of demonstrating plain or

structural error on appeal must direct their timely objections to the form and
content of prejudicial remarks. Unlike Johnson, Blume, and Wilson, however,

those advocates and defenders also must carefully explicate the adverse effect of
such remarks on the accused and the trier of fact, especially in the case of a jury.
And they must marshal the evidentiary record as a whole in weighing the full
import of those remarks.
Despite efforts to meet the heavy burden in Calhoun, to lodge timely objection,
and to adduce full and fair evidence of harm, race-conscious advocates and
defenders will make slow progress in casting an alternative canon or vision of the
prosecution and defense function in civil rights and criminal cases from the
procedural and substantive elements wrought by Sotomayor. For Sotomayor, the
question is not whether lawyers should object to race, rather the question is when

231.
232.
233.
234.

See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
See Johnson, Blume, & Wilson, supra note 26, at 782.
Id.
Id. at 782-83.
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to object and, moreover, how to object. On the timing of the objection, Sotomayor

points to the presence of a "racially charged" remark as the trigger for lawyer
intervention, yet she furnishes only vague categorical guidance on spotting the
mutable form and grasping the variable substance of such remarks. When is a
remark "racially charged"? Sotomayor offers no answer beyond implicit
references to common sense, institutional history, and professional intuition. On
the manner of objection, Sotomayor supplies even less guidance presuming a
race neutral, mechanically facile trial and appellate lawyering process belied by
the racialized, adversarial inequality of the criminal justice system and,
oftentimes, by the hard fought struggle of civil rights advocates and criminal
defenders of color to rise to a professional station in the courtroom 2 35 and to
survive in an embattled professional culture of racial privilege prevalent in the
bar and bench.236 How then best to time and to summons an objection to a
"racially charged" remark? Sotomayor again provides no answer. Moreover, she
makes no mention at all of legal education and training, no extensive citation to
professional regulation, and no explanatory reference to the culture, sociology,
and politics of the legal profession.
Because of the limitations of Sotomayor's account, race-conscious advocates
and defenders must search broadly in an attempt to resituate discrete incidents of
prosecutorial race talk in their larger institutional contexts where they may prove
more susceptible to systemic regulation, oversight, and enforcement. Within
these contexts stands the "managerial authority" of courts, governmental entities
(e.g., the Office of the Solicitor General and the U.S. Department of Justice), and
bar associations charged by statute or enabling legislation with the institutional
responsibility of supervising line prosecutors and ensuring conformity with state
and federal rules of professional conduct. 2 37 Multi-pronged in design, this
enlarged institutional focus enables lawyer, judicial, and legislative alliances as
well as community group coalitions to remedy prosecutorial race talk not only by
urging judicial sanctions, disciplinary referrals, and court- or institution-wide
monitoring, but also by engaging in outreach directed towards prosecutors,
judges, and legislators of color in order to forge affirmative grassroots, equal
justice campaigns. The task of internal and external institutional monitoring
provides abundant opportunities for anecdotal or empirical data collection on the
pervasiveness of courtroom race talk ideal for law school classroom field studies

235. See SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, 1880- 1915
(2013); KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012).
236. See DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA
(2012); DOROTHY H. EVENSEN

&

CARLA D. PRATT, THE END OF THE PIPELINE: A JOURNEY OF RECOGNITION FOR

AFRICAN AMERICANS ENTERING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2012).

237. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) cmt. 1 (2013) (defining the responsibility of partners,
managers, and supervisory lawyers in law firms and government agencies); ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics &
Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 467 (2014) (describing the managerial and supervisory obligations of
prosecutors under Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3).
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and clinical or externship research projects.
Absent these efforts, too often, as in Calhoun, the prosecutorial question or
remark at issue will be judged isolated, peripheral or even provoked. Likewise, as
in Calhoun, too often the harmful impact of the remark will be deemed mitigated
by the district court's jury selection methods or charging instructions. Similarly,
as in Calhoun, too often the gravity of the remark will be considered
overshadowed by larger, compelling evidence of the accused guilt. As the
outcome in Calhoun demonstrates, long-delayed predominantly race-neutral
denunciations of racially charged prosecutorial comments will neither prevent
nor cure the damage of racial stigma suffered by defendants and victims in
criminal cases. Once the "foul blow" of discrimination is struck at trial, its
repercussions for the accused, for the victim, and for their affiliated communities

will not be rectified or saved by a prosecutorial apology. Lines crossed will never
be uncrossed.
CONCLUSION
As America's inner-city streets and criminal courts await the new post-racial
century of equal justice, low-income communities of color, particularly their
vulnerable young men, continue to suffer the discrimination, indignity, and
curtailed liberty that accompany stigmatizing images and narratives of racial
identity. These racialized cultural and social constructions are seen, heard, and
spoken by prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, and judges in run-of-the-mill
and high profile cases across the nation. Their institutionally shared race talk
molds part of the daily socio-legal discourse typical of contemporary civil rights
and criminal trials in federal and state courts.
For more than half a century, bar associations, courts, and legislatures have
labored to regulate the use of race talk in civil rights and criminal cases only to
falter in describing its varied race-neutral, race-coded, and race-conscious forms,
and to flounder in prescribing the scope of its permissible use consonant with
professedly colorblind governing legal ethics rules and standards. The continuing
descriptive and prescriptive inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to fully define

and to effectively regulate race talk in the courtroom and in advocacy more
generally presents significant normative and strategic challenges for prosecutors,
defenders, and judges committed to racial justice values and race-conscious

professional ethics.
In my own work over two decades, I have investigated those challenges
through case studies of the prosecution and defense of black and white offenders
in the criminal justice system, and case studies of individuals and communities of
color in civil rights litigation and in allied grassroots, political action campaigns.
Carving out a common pathway, the studies have examined the meaning of racial
identity and narrative, the trial and retrial of race cases, the relationship between

race and ethics, the impact of racial and ethnic differences on civil rights and
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criminal trials, and the interrelationship between race and community. Albeit
limited in scope, this Essay extends that pathway, revisiting core civil rights and
criminal justice issues in light of Justice Sotomayor's surprising recent pronouncements in Calhoun v. United States. Here, as before, the purpose of the project is to
transform the pedagogy and practice of civil rights and criminal law inside
American courtrooms and law school classrooms, as well as outside in the offices
of prosecutors, public defenders, and law school community clinics. Like
Bongani Charles Calhoun, that transformation too awaits the post-racial century.

